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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ZACHERY DON ZAELIT, : Case No. 20090405-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (2008). The trial court entered judgment and conviction against Appellant 
Zachery Zaelit for theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony offense 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 and 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii) (2008). The judgment is 
attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Whether the State's evidence for the verdict was insufficient where it relied on 
uncorroborated, unsworn, inconsistent, out-of-court statements. 
Standard of Review: Where evidence is insufficient, this Court will reverse the 
conviction. A sufficiency issue is reviewed as follows: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
1 
was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous 
cases). An observation made by this court in Petree bears repeating here: 
[Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this 
Court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment 
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing 
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in 
order to sustain a verdict. 
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, f 155 63 P.3d 94 (citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
Preservation: The issue is raised under the plain-error doctrine. See State v. 
Holgqte, 2000 UT 74, ^ 13, 10 P.3d 346. This Court may review a sufficiency claim for 
plain error to avoid injustice. See id. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202, 76-6-408 (2008); Utah R. Evid. 801 (2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On July 25, 2008, the State filed an Information against Zaelit, Justin Llewelyn, 
and Britnee Emery for theft by receiving stolen property. (R. 1-3). On August 26, 2008, 
the court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound Zaelit over for trial on the charge. 
(See R. 27-28). On February 25, 2009, the court presided over a jury trial. (See R. 88-
91). At the conclusion, the jury found Zaelit guilty as charged. (R. 120). On April 14, 
2009, the trial court sentenced Zaelit to an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of 
one to fifteen years. (R. 128-29). On May 12, 2009, Zaelit filed a notice of appeal. (R. 
133). The appeal is timely. Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 (2009). Zaelit is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 21, 2008, Christine Armstrong woke early in the morning and discovered 
that her 1997 Toyota Camry was gone from her apartment complex at 3334 South 825 
East. (R. 143:51-52). She had last seen the car the night before. (R. 143:52). Armstrong 
contacted the dealership and authorities. (R. 143:52-53). The dealership engaged the GPS 
tracking device in the car and was able to track its location. (R. 143:53). The car was in 
West Jordan in a driveway for a trailer home at 1268 West 7055 South. (R. 143:53-55). 
Armstrong found items in the car that did not belong to her. (Id.) Also, her license plates 
were gone. (R. 143:56). Armstrong did not see who took the car. (R. 143:56). 
On July 21, authorities executed a search warrant at the trailer home. (See R. 
143:58). Technician Francine Bardole took inventory of a license plate in a southwest 
bedroom there. (R. 143:60-61; see also R. 143:61-63 (stating Bardole did not find the 
license plate and could not say where it was originally found)). 
Also, authorities took four people in custody from the trailer home and 
interrogated them at the police department. According to agents, three of the suspects 
implicated Zaelit in the theft. Agent David Olive interviewed Justin Llewelyn. (R. 
143:126). Olive testified that Justin appeared to understand questions during the 
interrogation, and he gave appropriate responses, although the responses were "a little 
vague here and there." (R. 143:126-27). Olive reported that Justin first saw the Toyota 
Camry parked at the trailer home the night before. (Id.) The license plate was missing 
and his friends were inside the trailer. (Id.) Justin came to the conclusion that the vehicle 
was probably stolen. (Id.) 
When Olive told Justin that a crime unit was processing the vehicle for prints, 
Justin changed his story. He "admitted that he was in the vehicle and that he had driven 
the vehicle." (R. 143:128). Justin refused to make a written statement: "he was afraid 
that Zachery [Zaelit] would see and read" it. (R. 143:128, 131). Later Justin changed his 
story again. He told Olive that Zaelit "was driving the vehicle" and Justin, Copper 
Hinton, and Britnee Emery were passengers. (R. 143:129). At some point Zaelit pulled 
the car off the road and Justin drove. (R. 143:129). Also, Zaelit took the group to the 
apartment complex for the Toyota. (R. 143:130). Notably, Olive did not have fingerprint 
information from the car: he "exaggerated" to get a confession. (R. 143:138). 
Next, Detective Kaer testified that he interviewed Copper Hinton at the police 
department. She claimed that she and Britnee Emery drove Zaelit and Justin around for a 
while, "then they went over to an apartment complex." (R. 143:144). Justin and Zaelit 
got out of Britnee's car and drove the stolen vehicle. (R. 143:144). Justin and Zaelit 
followed Copper and Britnee to the trailer home in West Jordan. (R. 143:145; but see R. 
143:149 (stating Copper and Britnee followed Justin and Zaelit)). 
Kaer also interviewed Britnee Emery. Her information was "slightly different." 
(R. 143:148). She and Copper "went and picked up both Justin and Mr. Zaelit, they went 
up in the area of 39th and 9th and they got into a car, and went back over to the place [the 
trailer home] in West Jordan." (R. 143:148). They may have made other stops. (R. 
143:149). According to Kaer, Britnee and Copper were both "honest right down to the 
drugs" they used. (R. 143: 150); but see State v. RimmascK 115 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 
1989) (ruling that testimony going to truthfulness is inadmissible). Kaer also 
acknowledged that "people lie to me." (R. 143:155). "[I]t's not uncommon for people to 
lie to the police." (R. 143:155). 
Copper, Britnee, and Justin denied the officers5 accounts at trial. Copper testified 
that on July 20, she was with Britnee, Justin, and Zaelit. (R. 143:66). She and Britnee 
picked up Justin and Zaelit at 3900 South and 700 East at 11:00 p.m. and they drove to 
the trailer home. (R. 143:66). She recalled that before going to the trailer, they stopped 
at some apartments, Justin and Zaelit got out of the car "for a brief moment," they "got 
back in [the car]" with Britnee and Copper, and they all went to the trailer home in 
Britnee's car. (R. 143:69, 70, 71, 76). The four spent "most of the time" in a bedroom, 
and at some point Justin and Copper went into the living room while Britnee and Zaelit 
slept. (R. 143:79, 83). The next morning, police arrived and transported them to the 
police department for questioning. (See R. 143:78, 79). 
Copper testified she was on drugs the night in question and did not remember de-
tails. (R. 143:67-68; see also R. 143:75-76). She did not recall telling officers that Justin 
and Zaelit got out and drove away in the stolen car. (R. 143:72). Also, Copper testified 
that when she spoke to Kaer she was "really high and I'm sure I would have said 
anything to get out of that [interrogation] room." (R. 143:74; see also R. 143:80, 81). 
Britnee's testimony was similar. She testified that she and Zaelit had been seeing 
each other, and they were in a fight that night. (R. 143:85-86). She drove Copper, Justin, 
and Zaelit in her car. (R. 143:87-88 (stating she borrowed her car from a friend)). At 
some point, Justin left, and they all ended up at the trailer. (R. 143:91). 
She could not remember the details because she was on heroin and meth. (R. 
143:88, 91, 95). She was awakened the next morning and arrested. (R. 143:88). Police 
transported her to the police department and put each person in a room for interrogation. 
(R. 143:89-90). Britnee told police that Zaelit was in the stolen car, but that was not true. 
(R. 143:90 (stating she told police he was in the car, but "I don't remember him being in 
the car")). The only person she saw in the Toyota was Justin. (R. 143:90, 101). She saw 
him "taking stuff out of the car. That's all I remember. I didn't know whose car it was or 
anything like that." (R. 143:90-91). He was in the car when she pulled up to the trailer 
home. (R. 143:91,92-93). 
Britnee did not recall telling police that she drove Zaelit and Justin to the 
apartment complex and they went to the stolen car and drove away in it. (R. 143:92). 
Nevertheless, she testified that if she made that statement to police, "I said it to get Zach 
[Zaelit] in trouble because we were fighting that night." (R. 143:92, 94, 100, 102). 
Justin testified that on July 20, he was with Zaelit at a barbecue until around 7:00 
that evening when they separated. (R. 143:106-07). Justin "went to talk to [his] wife for 
a little bit and then [he] wandered around and stole a car" (R. 143:106) from an apartment 
complex at 3300 South and 800 East (R. 143:109-10) because "the key was in it." (R. 
143:109). He took the car to his wife's aunt's trailer home, and Britnee and Copper 
followed him in Britnee's car. (R. 143:107-08, 110). Zaelit arrived half an hour later. 
(R. 143:107). They went to the back room to watch TV (R. 143:108-09), then Justin 
went to the front room and fell asleep on the couch, while Zaelit slept in the back room. 
(R. 143:108-09). At around 3:00 a.m., Justin took the license plate off the Toyota to 
conceal its identity. (R. 143:111-12). He went back into the living room until it was time 
to go to work. He did not go into the bedroom. (R. 143:113). When he went outside in 
the morning, "the police were already there." (R. 143:112). Justin denied speaking to the 
police or to Agent Olive about the matter. (R. 143:114). Also he admitted to stealing the 
car, taking it to the trailer home, and taking the license plate off. (R. 143:116). 
According to Justin, if agents maintained that he made an earlier statement 
implicating Zaelit in the theft, "[t]hat wouldn't be true." (R. 143:117). He refused to talk 
to agents. (R. 143:117, 118). Also, Justin entered a guilty plea for stealing the Toyota 
(R. 143:118, 119, 120-21), and "[i]n this particular case [he] acted alone, [he] did it by 
[him]self." (R. 143:119). The jury returned a verdict against Zaelit for theft by receiving 
stolen property. (R. 143:200). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State charged Zaelit with theft by receiving stolen property. Zaelit maintains 
the evidence was insufficient to support the charge. Specifically, the only witnesses to 
Zaelit's actions testified that he did not steal the vehicle, he did not possess it, he did not 
get into the vehicle for any reason, he did not remove the license plates, and he did not 
aid or abet Justin in his theft or possession of the car. In addition, the car was not found 
on Zaelit's property. Indeed, according to the witnesses, Justin stole the car and drove it 
to his wife's aunt's trailer home. Notwithstanding the testimony from witnesses, the 
State introduced evidence from law enforcement agents that the witnesses made unsworn, 
inconsistent, out-of-court statements implicating Zaelit in the theft. Yet the out-of-court 
statements are not sufficient to support that Zaelit committed the crime. Zaelit 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT ZAELIT 
COMMITTED THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, 
A. THE SUFFICIENCY STANDARD. 
Zaelit has raised a sufficiency issue. For sufficiency claims, this Court has stated, 
"We reverse the jury?s verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." The defendant must 
overcome a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury 
verdict. "We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," and 
"will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.5" However, though the burden is high, it is not impossible. 
"We will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." "Every 
element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." "To 
affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State has introduced evidence 
sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, f 10, 2 P.3d 954 (internal citations omitted); see 
also State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, % 14, 210 P.3d 288 (stating evidence and inferences 
will be considered in the light most favorable to the jury verdict) (citation omitted); 
Hoteate, 2000 UT 74, \ 18; State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, ^ 8, 157 P.3d 329 (stating 
if jurors could reasonably believe that the elements of the crime "were met, 'the verdict 
must stand5") (citation omitted). 
Utah courts require a defendant raising a sufficiency claim to marshal the evidence 
and to '"demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 13, 25 P.3d 985 (citations 
omitted); see also Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, f 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (stating the party 
contesting the verdict must assume the role of "devil's advocate"); West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating proper marshaling 
requires appellant to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence"). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, when conducting a sufficiency review, "it 
is the duty of the reviewing appellate court to perform its 'review in the context of the 
whole record, or at least that portion of the record to which its attention [is] drawn by the 
appellant's marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's marshaled 
evidence.'" State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, \ 24, 167 P.3d 1074 (citing S.B.D. v. State 
(State ex rel Z.D.), 2006 UT 54, ^  39, 147 P.3d 401). A sufficiency "inquiry ends," i± at 
f 26, if there is evidence for all elements, whether it is brought to the court's attention by 
way of marshaling or by way of appellee's brief. See. id_ at }^ 24. 
(1) Circumstantial Evidence or Conflicting Evidence May Support a Verdict If 
It Is Credible and Meets the Reasonable-Doubt Standard. 
Under Utah law, "'a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial 
evidence.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997)). "'Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded 
as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction.5" Lyman, 966 
P.2d at 281 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)); 
see also State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ffif 62-64, 152 P.3d 321 (considering circumstantial 
evidence for conviction); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991). If circumstantial 
evidence is presented, this Court must determine whether "the inferences that can be 
drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience 
sufficient to prove" each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 
(quoting State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)); State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 789 (Utah 1991) (stating "intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence"). 
In addition, Utah courts have ruled that evidence may be sufficient even if it is 
contradictory or conflicting. That is, the mere existence of conflicting evidence does not 
warrant reversal. See James, 819 P.2d at 784; Workman, 852 P.2d at 984 (stating "the 
jury serves as the exclusive judge" when evidence is in conflict/dispute) (cite omitted); 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 1993) (stating credibility is an issue for the 
jury); State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, | 18, 15 P.3d 635 (stating "it is the province 
of the trier of fact" to determine what testimony to believe and what inferences to draw). 
So long as credible evidence exists to support the elements of the crime, a 
reviewing court will not disturb the jury's decision. See_ Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 16. The 
court will assume that the jury sifted through the conflicts and contradictions and 
"'believed the evidence supporting the verdict.'" IcL at ^ 14 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1213); see also icL at | 16 (stating it is typically the function of the jury to weigh and 
assess conflicting evidence and "cto determine the credibility of the witnesses'") 
(emphasis in original; citations omitted); State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8, f 42, 994 P.2d 177; 
State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence 
or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and 
inferences that support the verdict'" (cite omitted)). However, if a witness's testimony is 
apparently false, the court may disregard it. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 16. In fact, a court 
may reevaluate a jury's verdict "where (1) there are material inconsistencies in the 
testimony and (2) there is no other circumstantial or direct evidence of the defendant's 
guilt." M, at Tf 19; see also id_ at f 21 (recognizing that a judge may "'disregard or 
discount'" evidence that is incredible) (citation omitted). 
(2) Evidence that Gives Rise to Speculative Possibilities or Inference upon 
Inference Is Insufficient. In Addition, a Verdict Supported Only by Out-of-
Court Inconsistent Statements Will Not Be Upheld. 
If a verdict is based on inferences that give rise to "speculative possibilities of 
guilt," it is not legally valid. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting Workman, 852 P.2d at 
985). A reviewing court will not indulge in "inference upon inference" or worse, 
"inference upon assumption." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(internal quotes and cites omitted), affd, State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. 
It will not take "speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 
136, Tf 10 (cite omitted). Rather, it is the function of a reviewing court to ensure there is 
"sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Merila, 966 
P.2d 270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal emphasis omitted) (quoting James, 819 
P.2d at 784; State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)). 
Likewise, uncorroborated "'out-of-court statements] which [are] denied at trial by 
the declarant [are] insufficient by [themselves] to sustain a conviction.'" State ex rel 
C.L., No. 20040037, 2005 UT App 221, * 1-2 (unpublished) (alternations in original) 
(citing State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989)); see also State v. Hamilton, No. 
20060131-CA, 2007 UT App 130, *1 (unpublished) (recognizing same). To be clear, an 
inconsistent out-of-court statement may be admissible in evidence at trial. However, it 
may be insufficient to support the verdict. "The distinction lies in the difference between 
admissibility of the prior statement, and the sufficiency of the evidence derived" from the 
statement. State v. Pierce, 906 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
Specifically, Rule 801 states that an inconsistent statement is admissible if the 
declarant is available to testify and subject to cross-examination. Utah R. Evid. 
801(d)(1). According to the rule, the prior inconsistent statement "is not hearsay." IcL at 
801(d)(1)(A). That is, it is not "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining "[h]earsay"). Rather, it may be offered to 
show that on a prior occasion, the witness made an inconsistent statement. See icl at 
801(d)(1)(A); see also Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4 (stating the supreme court shall adopt 
rules). In addition, evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach a 
witness. See Miller v. Archer, 749 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (admitting 
statements for impeachment), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
However, before evidence of an out-of-court inconsistent statement may be 
deemed sufficient to support a verdict, it must be corroborated by other facts and circum-
stances. See Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483-84 (citing cases where the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that uncorroborated inconsistent statements are insufficient by themselves to support 
a civil verdict); Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 14 (relying on Ramsey. 782 P.2d at 483); 
Hamilton, No. 20060131-CA, 2007 UT App 130, *1 (unpublished) (stating out-of-court 
inconsistent statements require corroboration to uphold a conviction); see also State v. 
Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986) (requiring out-of-court statements of a co-
conspirator to be verified by independent evidence of defendant's participation). The 
Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that a verdict cannot be based solely on out-of-
court statements unless the statements are "supported by a residuum of legal evidence 
competent in a court of law." Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 
1981) (footnote omitted); Hackford v. Industrial Comm *n, 358 P.2d 899, 901 (Utah 1961) 
(stating same); Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm yn, Yhl P.2d 376, 380 (Utah 1942) 
(stating same); see also Robbins, 2009 UT 23, \ 16 (recognizing that the civil standard-
the preponderance of the evidence - is less exacting than the criminal standard; and 
stating a trial court may "afford less deference" to inconsistent testimony in a criminal 
case than that afforded in a civil case). 
Other courts are in accord. See, e.g., Brower v. State, 728 P.2d 645, 648 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that "evidence of an uncorroborated prior inconsistent 
statement is not sufficient to establish evidence of a central element of the crime 
charged") (footnote and citation omitted); State v. Allred, 655 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Ariz. 
1982) (disavowing reliance on prior inconsistent statement where it was the only 
evidence to support defendant's commission of the crime); Acosta v. State, All A.2d 373, 
375-77 (Del. 1980) (affirming convictions for acts testified to in court, and reversing for 
acts supported only by officer's testimony of out-of-court statements from two 
witnesses); State v. Green, 667 So.2d 756, 760-61 (Fla. 1995) (stating prior inconsistent 
statements are not sufficient to support a criminal verdict without proper corroborating 
evidence); Moore v. State, A13 So.2d 686 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 485 So.2d 1279, 
1280-82 (Fla. 1986) (recognizing that two witnesses, who provided similar grand jury 
testimony against defendant, recanted those statements in sworn depositions and were 
prosecuted for perjury without specifying which statements were untrue; notwithstanding 
those circumstances, the prior statements made in grand jury proceedings would not 
support the murder conviction); People v. Collins, 21A N.E.2d 77, 85 (111. 1971) (stating 
"this court has refused to allow a conviction to be based solely on unsworn statements by 
witnesses"); Roby v. State, 495 N.E.2d 721 (Ind. 1986) (stating a conviction cannot be 
based solely upon a repudiated out-of-court statement unless there was substantial 
evidence of probative value to support the credibility of the statement); State v. Allien, 
366 So.2d 1308, 1311-12 (La. 1978) (stating a conviction cannot be based on prior 
inconsistent statements from two witnesses, who recanted the statements at trial); Pierce, 
906 S.W.2d at 733-35 (stating although Missouri law allows a prior statement to be used 
in evidence, inconsistent statements may not be the sole basis for the prosecution since 
such statements lack adequate safeguards to assure reliability; also, where the 
"prosecutrix, the hotline caller, and all witnesses (other than the authorities) totally 
recanted at trial," the conviction required reversal); State v. Gommenginger, 790 P.2d 
455, 463 (Mont. 1990) (stating an unreliable prior inconsistent statement is insufficient to 
support the conviction); State v. White Water, 634 P.2d 636, 638-39 (Mont. 1981) (stating 
a conviction cannot be based solely on prior inconsistent statements where the accuracy 
of the prior statement is repudiated at trial); United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 118-
19(6thCir. 1979) (ruling that even where prior inconsistent statements may be admissible 
as substantive evidence, they are insufficient as the sole evidence for a verdict). 
Still other courts have ruled that a prior inconsistent statement may be sufficient to 
support a conviction only if it possesses certain indicia of reliability, including having 
been made under oath or reduced to a signed statement. See, e.g.. People v. Lucky, 753 
P.2d 1052, 1070 (Calif. 1988) (stating inconsistent out-of-court statement may support 
conviction where it was made under oath or in a judicial proceeding), cert, denied, 488 
U.S. 1034 (1989); State v. Tomas, 933 P.2d 90, 98-100 (Hawaii Ct. App 1997) (allowing 
a prior inconsistent statement to be sufficient for conviction where it was in writing and 
signed), overruled on other grounds. State v. Gonsales, 984 P.2d 1272, 1275 n.l (Hawaii 
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1115-17 (NJ. 1991) (identifying a 
fifteen-factor test for reliability; and stating sufficiency depends on the extent to which 
other independent evidence corroborates the inconsistent statement); Commonwealth v. 
Lively, 610 A.2d 7, 10 (Pa. 1992) (allowing use of prior inconsistent statements to 
support the verdict if they are given under oath or at formal proceedings, are reduced to 
writing, or are recorded verbatim and contemporaneous with the making of the 
statements); State v. Marcy, 680 A.2d 76 (Vt. 1996) (stating prior inconsistent statement 
did not raise reliability concerns and was bolstered by some corroborating evidence 
sufficient to support the conviction); see also Utah R. Evid. 102 (2009) (stating the rules 
shall be construed to promote the development of the law to the end that "the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined"). 
In this case, the State relied on unsworn, uncorroborated, inconsistent, out-of-court 
statements to support the verdict. That was insufficient. 
B. THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH ZAELIT'S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE CHARGED OFFENSE. 
The State charged Zaelit with theft by receiving stolen property. Section 76-6-
408(1) defines that offense as follows: "A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it 
probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, 
or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending 
to deprive the owner of it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (2008). 
Utah courts have identified four elements for the offense where (1) property 
belonging to another has been stolen, (2) defendant received it, retained it, disposed of it, 
concealed it, sold it, withheld it, or aided in such, (3) defendant knew or believed the 
property was stolen, and (4) he acted purposely to deprive the owner of the property. See 
State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1986); see also State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 
401-02 (Utah 1980) (stating the last element concerns the defendant's intent at the time of 
possession); State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980) (identifying elements); State 
v. Hushes* No. 20010617, 2003 UT App 71, *1 (unpublished) (using "retained or 
withheld" as interchangeable); State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(stating that knowledge or belief "'is seldom directly proved and is usually inferred from 
the facts and circumstances in evidence5") (citations omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 
(Utah 1999); State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating the 
statute for receiving stolen property is divided into two separate parts, where the 
defendant may be culpable for receiving/retaining/disposing, or 
concealing/selling/withholding), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
The State's theory in this case hinged on direct liability or accomplice liability 
where Zaelit either stole, received, retained, withheld, or concealed the Toyota Camry 
himself, or he was a party to such offense. (See R. 143). 
For direct liability, the State was required to show that Zaelit had personal, con-
scious, and exclusive possession of the property. See State v. Dyett, 199 P.2d 155, 157 
(Utah 1948) (stating if the prosecution has not presented evidence directly connecting the 
defendant to the theft, possession must be personal, conscious and exclusive; "the mere 
association of a defendant with property recently stolen is insufficient"); State v. Brooks, 
126 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1942) (stating receipt of recently stolen property requires 
proof of conscious possession); State v. Kinsey, 295 P. 247, 249 (Utah 1931) (stating 
"possession must not only be personal, exclusive, and unexplained, but must also be 
conscious, or a conscious assertion of possession by the accused"); State v. Morris, 262 
P. 107, 110-11 (Utah 1927) (stating defendant must have personal, exclusive possession). 
For accomplice liability, the State was required to show that Zaelit had the mental 
state for the offense and he directly committed it, or he solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged or aided another in committing the offense. Se<e Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(2008) (defining accomplice liability); InreM.B.. 2008 UT App 433, | 7, 198 P.3d 1007. 
This Court has ruled that "'[m]ere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one 
an accomplice to a crime absent evidence showing - beyond a reasonable doubt - that [a] 
defendant advised, instigated, encouraged, or assisted in perpet[r]ation of the crime.'" 
M.B.* 2008 UT App 433, If 8 (alteration in original; citing In re V.T.. 2000 UT App 189,1f 
11, 5 P.3d 1234); see also DyetU 199 P.2d 157-58 (recognizing if the evidence supports 
that the defendant had a mere association with the property or was merely present at the 
place where the property was found, those facts are insufficient). 
"However, ' [w]hile mere presence at the scene of a crime affords no basis for a 
conviction, presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are 
circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.5" 
MJL 2008 UT App 433, \ 8 (citing American Fork City v. Rothe. 2000 UT App 277, | 7, 
12 P.3d 108). This Court further explained accomplice liability as follows: 
[In In re V.T.* 2000 UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234], this court concluded that a juvenile 
defendant's presence during and after a theft did not support a conclusion that he 
was an accomplice because no evidence suggested his active involvement. See id. 
TI20. The evidence showed that the defendant had been with friends when they 
stole a camcorder and that he remained in their presence following the theft while 
his friends discussed the crime. See id^ fl 2-5. The State argued that this evidence, 
coupled with the defendant's friendship with the thieves, supported an inference 
that the defendant encouraged the theft and was, therefore, guilty of the crime as 
an accomplice. Seeid^\\0. The juvenile court agreed. See id. ^7. We 
overturned the juvenile court's ruling, concluding that "[t]he facts . . . prove[d] 
only that [the defendant] was present before, during, and after the theft of the cam-
corder" and that "[t]he lack of any evidence showing that he at least encouraged 
the other defendants in stealing the camcorder preclude[d]" a determination that he 
was culpable as an accomplice. Id. If 20. 
2008 UT App 433,1f9. 
In short, the evidence must show that the defendant personally possessed or 
handled stolen property with knowledge or a belief of its circumstances, or he was in-
volved in the criminal enterprise. See Davis, 965 P.2d at 535 (recognizing the statute 
requires proof of possession and intent; and a "necessary element" is that "defendant 
knew the property was stolen or believed the property was probably stolen"); State v. 
Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986) (stating defendant was told the air compressor 
was stolen); State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983) (stating evidence supported 
defendant's efforts in altering the appearance of the vehicle for the charge of receiving 
stolen property); Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231-32 (ruling the evidence supported the 
conviction); M.B., 2008 UT App 433,111 (stating the evidence was insufficient where it 
failed to support defendant's active involvement); State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating defendant personally handled the stolen goods and a 
witness saw defendant and a second person with the goods, among other things). 
C. THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION. 
(1) The Marshaled Evidence. 
Zaelit does not dispute that on July 20 or July 21, 2008, Christine Armstrong's 
Toyota Camry was stolen from her apartment complex. (See R. 143:51-55 (Armstrong's 
testimony)). However, the evidence fails to support that Zaelit had any involvement in 
the crime, either directly or as an accomplice. See Kinsey, 295 P. at 249 (stating 
possession must be personal, exclusive, unexplained, conscious); see also In re M.B., 
2008 UT App 433, ^ f 9 (recognizing that mere presence is insufficient for a conviction). 
The marshaled evidence supports the following: 
• On July 21, Armstrong reported that her car was stolen from 3334 South 
825 East. (R. 143:51-52). She had last seen it on July 20 at about 9:45 p.m. (R. 
143:52). Officers used information from a GPS tracking device to locate the 
vehicle in a driveway for a trailer home at 1268 West 7055 South. (See R. 143:53-
55). Armstrong went to the trailer home, identified the car, and found clothes and 
items that did not belong to her. (See R. 143:54-55). Also, she testified the 
license plate(s) were gone. (R. 143:56). Armstrong did not give anyone 
permission to take her car. (See R. 143:52, 57). 
• On July 21, technician Bardole arrived at the trailer home and took 
inventory of a license plate in a back southwest bedroom of the trailer home. (R. 
143:60). She was not the person who originally found the license plate. She 
believed Detective Kaer found it. (R. 143:60, 61-62, 63; but see R. 143:152-53, 
157 (Kaer stating he did not go into the trailer or find the license plate(s))). 
• On July 21, Detective Kaer arrived at the trailer home and met Justin 
Llewelyn outside. (See R. 143:141). Also, Kaer knocked on the back door until 
Zaelit emerged from where the back bedroom would be. (R. 143:142; but see R. 
143:157 (Kaer stating he did not go into the trailer)). 
• Zaelit and Britnee slept in a back room. (SeeR. 143:108-09). 
• Copper testified that on July 20, she and Britnee picked up Justin and 
Zaelit at approximately 11:00 p.m. in the area of 3900 South and 700 East (R. 
143:66), approximately seven blocks from Armstrong's apartment. (See R. 
143:51-52). The four drove to a trailer home at 1268 West 7055 South. (See, e.g., 
R. 143:66). During the drive, they stopped at an apartment complex, Justin and 
Zaelit got out of the car "for a brief moment," they "got back in [the car]" with 
Britnee and Copper, and they continued to the trailer home in Britnee's car. (R. 
143:69, 70, 71, 76). The four were in a bedroom that night until Justin and Copper 
went into the living room. (See R. 143:79). 
• Britnee testified that on July 20, she and Copper picked up Justin and 
Zaelit in her car. (R. 143:87-88 (stating Britnee borrowed her car); 143:95-96). 
At some point, Justin left and they all ended up at the trailer home. (R. 143:91). 
Britnee saw Justin in the stolen car. (R. 143:90, 101). She saw him take "stuff out 
of the car." (R. 143:90-91). 
• Detective Kaer interviewed Copper. He stated she was lucid and he had 
no problems with the interview. (R. 143:143, 145). He testified that on July 21, 
she made statements implicating Zaelit in the car theft. According to Kaer, 
Copper and Britnee drove Zaelit and Justin around for a while, "then they went 
over to an apartment complex." (R. 143:144). Justin and Zaelit got out of 
Britnee's car and drove the stolen vehicle. (R. 143:144). Justin and Zaelit 
followed Copper and Britnee to the trailer in West Jordan, and Copper "saw them 
take some stuff out of the [stolen car] and go inside" the trailer. (R. 143:145). 
• Copper did not remember talking to officers or telling them that Justin 
and Zaelit got into the stolen car and drove away. (R. 143:68, 71-72). 
• Detective Kaer also interviewed Britnee. He testified that Britnee's 
statements and Copper's statements were "slightly different," but "the story was 
the same," and "almost identical." (R. 143:148). According to Kaer, Britnee and 
Copper drove Zaelit and Justin in Britnee's car to the area of 3900 South and 900 
East, and Zaelit and Justin got into the stolen car and drove it to the trailer home. 
(R. 143:148, 149). Britnee and Copper followed the men to the trailer home. (R. 
143:149). Britnee told Kaer they made a stop at another complex at some point. 
(R. 143:149 (stating Britnee's statement was "kind of confusing")). 
• Britnee vaguely remembered talking to officers and she maintained at 
trial that her prior statements to officers were not true. (R. 143:90, 92, 100-01). 
• Britnee did not put the license plate in the bedroom. (R. 143:94). 
• Justin testified that on July 20, he was with Zaelit early in the evening, 
until approximately 7:00 p.m., then he left to steal a car from an apartment 
complex at 3300 South and 800 East because the key was in it. (See R. 143:106-
07, 109-10, 116). At some point he had Britnee and Copper follow him in their 
car to the trailer in West Jordan (R. 143:108, 110; see also R. 143:107), and Zaelit 
showed up at around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. (R. 143:106-07; see also supra, page 20 
(Copper and Britnee testified that Zaelit was in their car)). 
• After 3:00 that morning, Justin took the license plate off the stolen car to 
conceal its identity. (R. 143:111-12). However, he did not go into the back room 
again that morning. (R. 143:113). 
• Justin threw the license plate on or in a 1967 Chrysler parked in the 
carport for the trailer home. (R. 143:124). The trailer home belonged to Justin's 
wife's aunt, Shauna Green. (See R. 143:157-58). Green was at the trailer that 
morning when officers arrived. (R. 143:157). She would not consent to a search. 
(R. 143:158). 
• Agent Olive interviewed Justin. (R. 143:126). According to Olive, 
Justin saw the Toyota Camry for the first time when it was parked at the trailer 
home. (R. 143:127). The license plate was missing and his friends were inside 
the trailer. (Id.) Justin came to the conclusion that the vehicle was stolen. (Id.) 
Later Justin changed his story. He "admitted that he was in the vehicle and that he 
had driven the vehicle." (R. 143:128). Justin "refused" to make a written state-
ment because "he was afraid Zachary [Zaelit] would see and read his statement." 
(R. 143:128, 131). Justin later changed his story again and claimed Zaelit was 
driving the stolen car, and Justin, Copper, and Britnee were passengers. (R. 143: 
129). At some point Zaelit pulled the car off the road and Justin drove. (Id.) Also, 
Zaelit took them to the apartment complex for the car. (R. 143:130, 136, 138). 
• Justin denied talking to Olive. (R. 143:114; see also R. 143:117. 118). 
• Detective Madsen testified that after Zaelit was transported to the police 
station, he conducted an interview. Zaelit waived his rights per Miranda, and 
agreed to talk. (R. 143:162). Zaelit told Madsen that he had been with Justin the 
day before, but he would not elaborate, and he was not "real compliant" during the 
interview. (R. 143:162). According to Madsen, Zaelit wanted to go straight to 
jail: he was cold and hungry, and being on the street was hard on him because he 
used drugs. (R. 143:162, 167, 170). Also, Zaelit told Madsen, "I haven't done 
nothing, I haven't done nothing." (R. 143:162,163). Zaelit avoided Madsen's 
questions, so Madsen left the room to let Zaelit "gain his composure." (R. 
143:163). 
• Madsen returned with Kaer a short time later to continue the interview 
with Zaelit, but it was "more of the same." (R. 143:163). As the officers left the 
room a second time, Zaelit was "somewhat belligerent and raising his voice and 
whatnot throughout the interview and it was at this point he got extremely 
belligerent and he began to scream . . . where you could probably hear it all the 
way downstairs . . . 'I need to talk to my lawyer.'" (R. 143:163-64). He yelled, 
"I'll talk to you when I get a lawyer and then you can watch how irritated I'll be." 
(R. 143:164). Also, he used profanity. (R. 143:164); but see State v. Wazner, 
2009 MT 256, ffif 15-20, ~ P.3d - (Mont. August 2009) (stating a prosecutor may 
not elicit testimony concerning defendant's request to speak to a lawyer in order to 
suggest guilt, and citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 614 n.5 (1976)) (attached as 
Addendum C); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618-19 (ruling a prosecutor may not use a 
defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings to suggest guilt). 
• Zaelit told Madsen that officers would not find his fingerprints on the 
stolen car. (R. 143:168). 
While the marshaled evidence supports that Justin stole the car, the only evidence 
implicating Zaelit consisted of unsworn, out-of-court statements. (Supra, pages 20-22, 
herein). Yet the State failed to present credible, independent, corroborating evidence for 
the out-of-court statements. See Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 484; CL_, No. 20040037, 2005 UT 
App 221 (unpublished); (see also supra, Arg. A.(2), herein). 
(2) The State's Evidence of Out-of-Court Statements Was Insufficient. 
(a) The Out-of-Court Statements Lacked Corroboration. 
Under Utah law, a verdict based on an out-of-court statement that a declarant 
recants is insufficient, unless the statement is corroborated. See Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 483-
84; Hamilton, No. 20060131-CA, 2007 UT App 130, *1 (unpublished); CL, No. 
20040037, 2005 UT App 221, *l-2 (unpublished); (see also supra. Arg. A.(2)). In this 
case, Detective Kaer and Agent Olive claimed that Justin, Copper, and Britnee made 
statements to police implicating Zaelit in the theft. (R. 143:127-30 (stating Justin 
changed his story to implicate Zaelit); 143:144-45 (stating Copper claimed Justin and 
Zaelit went to the apartment complex and drove the stolen vehicle to the trailer); 143:148 
(stating Britnee claimed Zaelit and Justin got into the stolen car at 3900 South and 900 
East and drove to the trailer in West Jordan)). Yet Justin, Copper, and Britnee denied 
those statements. (See, e.g., R. 143:72-73 (Copper did not recall making such statements 
to police); 143:90, 92 (Britnee did not recall making the statements to police, and she 
denied seeing Zaelit in the car); 143:114 (Justin denied speaking to the police or to his 
parole officer about the matter)); (see also supra, Arg. C.(l), herein). 
And in this case, the State failed to present evidence of corroborating facts or 
circumstances to support the out-of-court statements. It failed to present evidence that 
Zaelit was in personal, conscious, and exclusive possession of the car at any time. (R. 
143); see HM, 727 P.2d 221, 223 (describing elements for the offense); Dyett, 199 P.2d at 
157 (requiring evidence of personal, conscious, exclusive possession for a conviction); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1). In addition, it failed to present evidence that Zaelit made 
any solicitation, request, command, or encouragement of Justin or that he aided Justin in 
receiving, retaining, disposing of, concealing, selling, or withhold the property. See_ Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2008) (defining accomplice liability); M.B., 2008 UT App 433, If 
8 (recognizing evidence must support defendant's participation; also, mere presence will 
not support a conviction). 
For example, Armstrong did not describe finding items in her car belonging to 
Zaelit. (R. 143:54-55). No reliable witness identified Zaelit as involved in the matter. 
(See R. 143; infra, Arg. C.(2)(b), herein). Officers did not find Zaelit's fingerprints in the 
car or on the license plate(s). {See R. 143). Shauna Green, the owner of the trailer home, 
had access to areas where Justin placed the license plate(s) and she had the opportunity to 
bring the license plate(s) into the trailer home. {See R. 143:124 (stating Justin removed 
the license plate and placed it on or in a car in the carport); see also R. 143:58-60, 157-58 
(stating an officer found the license plate in a bedroom while executing a search warrant; 
also, Green was at the trailer home on July 21 and did not consent to a search of the 
trailer requiring officers to return later with the warrant)). 
Moreover, the offense at issue here could be committed easily by a single person: 
it did not require the aid, encouragement, or support of a second party to serve as lookout 
or to drive a getaway vehicle. See_ Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (defining theft by 
receiving stolen property). And the officers did not find the car at an address relevant to 
Zaelit except that he was staying at the trailer home with four other people (see, e.g., R. 
143:157-58), one of whom had admitted to the offense and was related to the owner of 
the trailer home (Justin). (See, e.g., id.: see also R. 143:106, 109-10, 116, 118, 119). 
Without credible independent evidence to corroborate the out-of-court statements, the 
verdict cannot stand. (See, e.g., supra, Arg. A.(2)). 
(b) The Out-of-Court Statements Lacked Trustworthiness and Reliability. 
The prior inconsistent statements themselves were not sufficient to constitute 
corroboration because they lacked trustworthiness. See State v. Mauchlev, 2003 UT 10, f 
52, 67 P.3d 477 (stating factors to consider in assessing the credibility of an out-of-court 
statement include, "evidence as to the spontaneity of the statement; the absence of 
deception, trick, threats, or promises to obtain the statement; the defendant's positive 
physical and mental condition, including age, education, and experience; and the 
presence of an attorney when the statement is given"); Scott v. HK Contractors, 2008 UT 
App 370, Tj 10, 196 P.3d 635 (identifying factors for reliability), cert, denied, 205 P.3d 
103 (Utah 2009); State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, f 27, 32 P.3d 976 (identifying 
several factors to shed light on the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement, 
including, the declarant's motive for making the statement; '"the character of the 
declarant for truthfulness and honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue;'" 
"'whether the [statement] was given voluntarily, under oath, subject to cross examination 
and a penalty for perjury;'" '"the extent to which the [declarant's statement] reflects his 
personal knowledge;5" '"whether the [declarant] ever recanted his [statement];'" and 
'"whether the declarant's statement was insufficiently corroborated'") (alterations in 
original; citations omitted). 
Justin's Out-of-Court Statements Were Not Reliable. Beginning with Justin, 
Agent Olive testified he interrogated Justin after Justin was arrested and in police custody 
at the police department. (R. 143:126). Olive claimed Justin appeared to understand 
questions during the interrogation, and he gave appropriate responses, although some 
responses were "a little vague here and there." (R. 143:126-27; but see R. 143:112 
(stating Justin was "high" on meth)); Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, Tf 52 (considering the 
declarant's physical and mental condition as part of the credibility assessment). Olive did 
not specify which responses were vague, leaving the jury to guess. (R. 143:126-27). In 
addition, during the interrogation, Justin changed his story in response to Olive's 
interrogation techniques and trickery. (See R. 143:127 (stating Justin claimed first that he 
saw the stolen car parked at the West Jordan trailer home and concluded it was stolen); 
143:128 (stating Justin then admitted he was in the vehicle after Olive told him that a unit 
was processing the vehicle for fingerprints); 143:129-30 (stating Justin again changed his 
story to claim Zaelit drove the stolen car and the others were passengers)). 
Moreover, Justin's out-of-court statements were not spontaneous, he was not 
under oath or subject to cross examination when he made the statements to the agent, he 
was in custody and en route to prison, he did not have access to counsel, and officers did 
not record his statements. (See, e.g., R. 143:125-39 (Olive's testimony)). The available 
information fails to support Justin's character for honesty, and it fails to support that the 
unsworn, unrecorded statements were reliable or trustworthy to support a conviction. 
See, e.g., Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ^  52 (identifying factors for credibility); Webster, 2001 
UT App 238, f 27 (identifying factors that shed light on trustworthiness); see also Gray, 
717 P.2d at 1318 (requiring the State to support a co-conspirator's out-of-court 
statements with independent and exclusive evidence of the defendant's participation). 
Indeed, since Justin was directly involved in the theft, the evidence supports that 
he was motivated to make statements implicating Zaelit in an effort to curry favor with 
authorities, likely in the hopes that they would be lenient with him. See Webster, 2001 
UT App 238, f 27 (identifying factors that shed light on trustworthiness, including 
motive). Where Justin's prior out-of-court statements themselves were internally 
inconsistent (see Robbins, 2009 UT 23, fflf 18-19 (stating trial court should reevaluate 
verdict when testimony is contradictory or inconsistent)), obtained through police 
trickery, and likely motivated out of a desperate attempt to gain favor with authorities, the 
out-of-court statements lack trustworthiness. See, e.g., Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, | 52; 
Webster, 2001 UT App 238, If 27. 
The Out-of-Court Statements Made by Copper and Britnee Were Not Reliable. As 
for Copper and Britnee, their earlier statements were not reliable. Indeed, both testified 
that they did not recall making specific statements to officers. (See R. 143:68, 71-72 
(Copper did not remember making statements); 143:90, 92, 100-01 (Britnee vaguely 
remembered talking to officers)). And each acknowledged that her prior out-of-court 
statements were unreliable. (R. 143:68, 74 (Copper stated she was high when she made 
out-of-court statements); 143:93-94 (Britnee stated she wanted to get Zaelit in trouble 
when she made the statements because they were fighting)). 
Kaer did not record the out-of-court statements. (See R. 143:145-46 (stating 
Copper agreed to make a written statement, but giving no indication that she did or that 
the statement was somehow recorded); see also R. 143:140-59 (Kaer's testimony)). In 
addition, both Copper and Britnee were on drugs when they talked to Kaer. (R. 143:67-
68, 75-76; 143:88, 91, 95); Peoyle v. Washington. 486 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662-63 (N.Y. Sup. 
1985) (ruling that intoxication may impair a defendant's ability to understand 
circumstances of the interrogation). Both were treated initially as suspects in the car 
theft. (See R. 1-3 (charging Britnee); 143:80 (Copper stating she was a suspect)). Thus, 
under the law, their statements inculpating Zaelit specifically "lack[ed] trustworthiness." 
State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Moreover, both had additional motives for falsely implicating Zaelit in the theft. 
According to Copper, she made the statements because she would have said anything to 
get out of the interrogation room at the police department. (R. 143:74; see also R. 
143:80, 81). And Britnee told police that Zaelit was in the stolen car, but that was not 
true. (R. 143:90 (stating she told police he was in the car, but "I don't remember him 
being in the car")). She fabricated statements because she and Zaelit were in a fight that 
night. (R. 143: 85-86, 90). She was angry at him and wanted to get him in trouble. (R. 
143:92,94, 100, 102). 
The evidence fails to support that the prior statements were spontaneous, under 
oath, subject to cross examination, or made in the presence of an attorney. (R. 143:40-
59). Rather, they were made under the pressure of a police interrogation. (See R. 143: 
140-59 (Kaer's testimony)); Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ^ f 52 (discussing factors to consider 
in assessing credibility of an out-of-court statement); Scott, 2008 UT App 370, Tf 10 
(same); Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ^  27 (identifying factors to consider for reliability). 
Although Kaer claimed that Copper and Britnee were "honest" in the interview, 
"right down to the drugs" they used (R. 143:150), the index of reliability here is very low. 
The available information fails to support their character for honesty or the reliability of 
the prior out-of-court statements under the exacting standard for a criminal conviction. 
(See, e.g., R. 143:155 (Kaer acknowledging that people lie to police); R. 143:153 (Kaer 
acknowledging that Copper may not have specified which drugs she used); 143:149-50, 
153 (reflecting that Britnee lied to Kaer; also, she was honest about the drugs she used 
because officers found drugs in her possession)); see also Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, f 52 
(discussing factors to consider for credibility of out-of-court statements); Webster, 2001 
UT App 238, Tf 27 (identifying factors to consider for reliability); Moore, 485 So.2d at 
1280-82 (stating where two witnesses recanted prior statements implicating defendant, 
prior statements would not support a murder conviction beyond a reasonable doubt). The 
out-of-court statements lacked credibility and corroboration for purposes of the 
sufficiency standard. (See supra, Arg. A(2)). 
The Evidence Supports that Justin Was the Only Person Involved in the Theft. 
Based on the undisputed evidence here, Justin possessed the stolen car. (R. 143:90-91, 
101 (Britnee testified she saw Justin in the car); see also R. 143:106, 109-10, 116, 118, 
119 (Justin admitted he was the only person to steal the car)). He acted alone. (R. 
143:119). Justin drove the car to the trailer home. (R. 143:107-08). He removed the 
license plate(s). (R. 143:111-12). He had an opportunity to put things in the car or 
remove things that did not belong to him. (R. 143:90-91). He put the license plate(s) in 
or on a car in Shauna Green's carport. (R. 143:124, 157). In addition, Green refused to 
let officers search her trailer, and she would have had the opportunity to move the license 
plate(s) to a bedroom before officers searched the trailer. (See R. 143:157-58). 
Notwithstanding the evidence, the State pursued a conviction against Zaelit 
because he was the only person who refused to cooperate with police. (See R. 143:196 
(stating the three other witnesses were interviewed, but the fourth "wouldn't say 
anything")). In fact, the prosecutor summed up his case with an analogy involving four 
cats and a mouse in a box. (R. 143:196). According to the analogy, the mouse went 
missing. Consequently, agents interviewed the four cats: "There were four cats in the 
box with that mouse and they interviewed each of those cats and three of the cats told 
them exactly what happened. The other cat [Zaelit] wouldn't say anything but I'm 
suggesting to you that those statements made by those three witnesses are reliable and 
they're consistent with one another and they're very accurate. And I'm convinced that 
you as jurors are capable of making that decision, that determination about the witnesses 
and the truth of that." (R. 143:196-97). 
The evidence in this case supports that four witnesses were confronted about the 
stolen car at a trailer where they spent the night. (See, e.g., R. 143:182 (identifying all 
four individuals as "suspects" when they were found); 143:195 (stating "these four 
people were involved" and they "all did different things")). When Justin was confronted, 
he made out-of-court statements that were erratic and in response to Olive's trickery. 
(See supra, page 26). At trial, he made sworn statements that were consistent with 
testimony from other witnesses and the evidence. (See, e.g., R. 143:90-91 (Britnee saw 
Justin in the car)). Also, Britnee and Copper made out-of-court statements to shift the 
blame and the focus from themselves to Zaelit. (SeeR. 143:144-45, 148-49). Their out-
of-court statements "lack[ed] trustworthiness." Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. 
Indeed, there is no credible or corroborating evidence to support the out-of-court 
statements. Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 484 (stating a verdict based on an out-of-court statement 
that a declarant recants is insufficient, unless the statement is corroborated; and citing 
Utah cases); CX, No. 20040037, 2005 UT App 221, * 1-2 (unpublished); see also 
Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f^ f 16, 19 (recognizing that the criminal standard for a verdict is 
more exacting than the civil standard; also stating a court may reevaluate a jury verdict 
where "(1) there are material inconsistencies in the testimony and (2) there is no other 
circumstantial or direct evidence of the defendant's guilt"); (supra, Arg. A.(2), herein). 
The remaining evidence gives rise to "speculative possibilities of guilt," Brown, 
948 P.2d at 344, and "inference upon assumption." Layman, 953 P.2d at 791. It requires 
the jury to take "speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 
136, ^ 10. And it supports that Zaelit merely associated with Justin sometime before and 
after the theft. (See, e.g., R. 143:107). That is not enough. "'Mere presence, or even 
prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice to a crime absent evidence showing -
beyond a reasonable doubt - that [a] defendant advised, instigated, encouraged, or 
assisted in perpet[r]ation of the crime.5" M.B., 2008 UT App 433, \ 8 (citation omitted); 
V.T., 2000 UT App 189, fflf 19-20 (stating evidence was insufficient to support 
defendant's involvement in the theft where he was merely present during the crime); see 
also Dyett, 199 P.2d at 157 (stating if the prosecution has not presented evidence directly 
connecting the defendant to the theft, possession must be personal, conscious and 
exclusive; "the mere association of a defendant with property recently stolen is 
insufficient"); Brooks, 126 P.2d at 1046 (stating receipt of recently stolen property 
requires proof of conscious possession); Kinsey, 295 P. at 249 (stating "possession must 
not only be personal, exclusive, and unexplained, but must also be conscious, or a 
conscious assertion of possession by the accused"); Morris, 262 P. at 110-11 (recognizing 
that for criminal liability, defendant must have personal and exclusive possession of the 
recently stolen property). The conviction should be reversed. 
D. THIS COURT MAY CONSIDER THE SUFFICIENCY ISSUE UNDER THE 
PLAIN-ERROR DOCTRINE. 
In State v. Holzate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346, the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether a defendant must specifically move to dismiss a charge in the trial court to pre-
serve a sufficiency issue for appeal. The court stated, "As a general rule, claims not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." IdL at If 11. Also, "the preser-
vation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant 
can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances1 exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. 
The court in Holgate specified that the preservation rule serves two purposes. 
First, "'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" IdL (cite omitted). 
Second, the defendant "should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse.'" I(L (cite omitted). 
The Court here may decide the sufficiency issue under the plain-error doctrine. 
The plain error exception enables the appellate court to "balance the need for 
procedural regularity with the demands of fairness." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
122 n. 12 (Utah 1989). "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to 
avoid injustice." \State v. Eldredze, 113 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989).] To demon-
strate plain error, a defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
/fo/gafe, 2000 UT 7 4 ^ 1 3 . 
The first prong of plain error is met based on a review of the record. Specifically, 
competent evidence fails to support that Zaelit received, retained, or disposed of stolen 
property, or concealed, sold or withheld it either directly or as an accomplice. (See supra, 
Args. A.(2), and C, herein); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (defining receipt of stolen 
property); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (defining accomplice liability); In re M.B., 2008 
UT App 433,f 7 (discussing accomplice liability). Rather, the verdict is based on 
uncorroborated, unreliable, unsworn, out-of-court statements. (See supra, Arg. C, 
herein). That is insufficient under Utah law. See_ Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 484 (citing Utah 
cases); CJL, No. 20040037, 2005 UT App 221, * 1-2 (unpublished); Robbins, 2009 UT 
23, Yh 16, 19, 22-23; (supra, Arg. A.(2)). Thus, error exists. 
Under the second prong of the analysis, the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court: The trial court is charged with knowing the law and applying it. See. Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.B.(2) (2009) (stating a judge shall apply the law and 
maintain professional competence). In this case, the law applicable to the charge was 
available and should have been obvious to the court. (See supra, Arg. A. (reciting Utah 
law relating to the sufficiency of the evidence and out-of-court statements); Arg. B. 
(reciting Utah law for receipt of stolen property)). 
In addition, the trial court presided over the trial. (R. 143). Thus, the facts would 
have been obvious to the trial court. (See R. 143 (reflecting active participation in the 
trial by the court); see also supra Arg. C. (discussing evidence)). Where the facts and the 
law would have been obvious to the trial court, it was error for the court to allow the 
charge for theft by receiving stolen property to go to the jury; indeed, the charge was 
based solely on uncorroborated, unreliable, unsworn, out-of-court statements. (See 
supra, Arg. C, herein); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2008) (stating when it 
appears to the court that the evidence is insufficient to put a defendant to his defense, the 
court shall order him to be discharged); Holzate, 2000 UT 74, \ 17. 
With respect to the prejudice prong for plain error, where evidence is insufficient, 
the conviction is erroneous and the verdict is not sustainable. Prejudice is self-evident: 
Zaelit has been unjustly convicted of a felony offense based on unreliable, uncorrobo-
rated, inadequate evidence. (See supra, Arg. C, herein). To ensure that the verdict is not 
unlawful, this Court should review Zaelit's claim of insufficient evidence. 
This Court may reach the merits of Zaelit's sufficiency claim under the plain-error 
analysis. The interests identified in Holgate are served. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11 
(stating a trial court "ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if 
appropriate, correct it"; and a defendant should not be allowed to forego an objection to 
enhance his strategy if he is convicted). Specifically, the error here was obvious and 
fundamental. (See supra, Args. A(2), and C, herein). Thus, it should have been apparent 
to the trial court that the charge could not be supported under the law. (See supra, Args. 
A.(2), and C.) Since the error was obvious, the trial court should have addressed it at trial 
and corrected it. See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3. 
In addition, Zaelit has not realized any benefit by foregoing an objection to the 
insufficient evidence in the trial court. If anything, the delay has been to Zaelit5 s 
detriment. He has been sentenced to prison for the offense even where the evidence is 
insufficient. The lack of an objection in the trial court and in the context raised on appeal 
has not enhanced Zaelit's chances of prevailing on appeal; rather, it has forced him to 
raise the issue under the plain-error doctrine, and it has served to delay a decision that 
should have been made in the trial court. Where this Court is able to review the record 
and apply the law, it may consider the sufficiency claim here for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant Zachary Zaelit respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the conviction in this case for insufficient evidence. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (2008) 
§ 76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for con-
duct of another 
Iwcry person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an of-
fense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973. c. 196, §76-2-202. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (2008) 
§ 76-6-408. Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who con-
ceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it, 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an ac-
tor who; 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or repre-
sentative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to 
require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate 
next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) livery pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or rep-
resentative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of Sub-
section (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it 
to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the de-
fendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or col-
lecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, 
or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, con-
cealed, or withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection 
(2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the defendant to show thai the property bought, re-
ceived, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3). and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in 
Section 76-10-901, 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or 
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same property back again 
to the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on persona! property by taking chattel mortgage security 
on the property and takes or receives the personal property into his possession and 
who sells the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other personal 
property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of 
the property. 
CRLI)ri(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-408; Laws 1979, c. 71, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 102, § 1; Laws 
2004. c. 299, § 16, cff. Jan. 1. 2005. 
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UTAH R. EVJD. 801 (2009) 
RULE 801, DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct 
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent 
with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence 
or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) 
the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the 
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or 
(K) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
CREDII(S) 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.] 
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Supreme Court of Montana. 
STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appel-
lee, 
v. 
Christopher William WAGNER, Defen-
dant and Appellant. 
No. DA 08-0495. 
Submitted on Briefs June 9, 2009. 
Decided Aug. 4. 2009. 
Background: Following a jury trial, de-
fendant was convicted in the District 
Court, Eighteenth Judicial District, 
County of Gallatin. John C. Brown, J., of 
attempted deliberate homicide with a 
weapon. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Mike 
McGrath. C.J.. held that: 
(1) common law plain error doctrine 
would be applied, and 
(2) prosecutor's repeated comments at 
trial regarding statements defendant 
made after invoking his Miranda rights 
during police interview created inference 
of guilt that constituted plain error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Jim Rice, L. filed dissenting opinion. 
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the 
Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For 
the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC-
07-97C, Honorable John C. Brown, Pre-
siding Judge .For Appellant: Jim Whcclis, 
Chief Appellate Defender; Koan Mercer. 
Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, 
Montana. 
For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock. Mon-
tana Attorney General; Mark W. Matti-
oli, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, 
Montana, Marty Lambert, Gallatin Coun-
ty Attorney; Todd Whipple, Deputy 
County Attorney, Bo/cman, Montana. 
Chief Justice MIKE. McGRATH deli-
vered the Opinion of the Court. 
*1 •] 1 Christopher William Wagner 
(Wagner) appeals from a jury verdict, 
judgment and sentence of the Eighteenth 
Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, 
convicting him of attempted deliberate 
homicide with a weapon. We reverse and 
remand for a new7 trial. 
*][ 2 The sole issue on appeal is whether 
the prosecutor's repeated comments at 
trial regarding statements Wagner made 
after invoking his Miranda rights created 
an inference of guilt that constituted 
plain error. 
BACKGROUND 
€i] 3 This case arises from a gun fight in 
which Wagner and Michael Peters (Pe-
ters) shot each other. Peters dated Mclo-
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dy Lark (Lark) from 1996 through 2000 
in Bo/eman. and they remained friends 
afterwards. Lark dated Wagner in Colo-
rado for about four months in the sum-
mer of 2004, and then after travelling for 
a few months, she lived with Wagner for 
about five months. The relationship dete-
riorated while they lived together. Lark 
began to fear Wagner because he was 
often angry, paranoid, under the influ-
ence of mcthamphetaminc, shot guns 
around his property, and discussed harm-
ing himself or others. Eventually Lark 
ended the relationship and moved out. 
*[ 4 Lark testified that Wagner assaulted 
her the evening of October 8, 2005, after 
their relationship had ended. Wagner ap-
proached her from behind and knocked 
her out. She woke up outside with her 
head and ears bleeding. She went inside, 
but Wagner was there and took her 
phones away when she tried to call for 
help. Wagner eventually agreed to take 
her to a friend's house. Lark was later 
diagnosed with a skull fracture and trau-
matic brain injury- The doctor reported 
that her head injury was caused by an 
instrument hitting her head three or more 
times. Peters flew to Denver to visit Lark 
in the hospital following the assault. 
*i\ 5 The State o[ Colorado filed felony 
assault charges against Wagner. While 
the charges were pending, Wagner was 
released on bail with a GPS tracker 
around his ankle. Wagner removed the 
GPS tracker and fled Colorado. 
*i| 6 Wagner came to Montana where he 
went by the name Curt Warren (and oth-
er aliases) and told people that his preg-
nant wife had died in a car accident. In 
early January 2007, Wagner hired a pri-
vate investigator to find Peters' address. 
The investigator provided three ad-
dresses in Bo/eman. About January 11, 
2007, Wagner went looking for Peters at 
his home. Peters' father, John, answered 
the door and told Wagner that Peters was 
not home. Wagner told John to tell Peters 
that his friend, Jim, was passing through 
town. When John asked where he was 
from, Wagner hesitated before replying 
Kalispell. John thought that it was un-
usual that the man, who looked like a 
vagrant, had walked to his house on a 
very cold day. Later John recounted the 
incident to Peters, who did not know a 
Jim from Kalispell. Peters became con-
cerned that the visitor was Wagner. Pe-
ters was afraid due to Wagner's attack on 
Lark and a previous assault when Wagn-
er had beaten and stabbed an cx-
girlfricnd's boyfriend. Peters renewed his 
concealed weapons permit and asked 
Lark to email him a picture of Wagner. 
Peters' father could not positively con-
firm from the picture whether the man 
who had visited was Wagner. 
*2 T| 7 On January 17, 2007. Peters left 
his house around noon. As he started to 
drive away in his truck, Peters noticed a 
person walking down the street towards 
him. The man flagged Peters down and 
he rolled down the window to talk. The 
man asked Peters if he had seen a little 
white dog, but then pulled a gun on him. 
Peters figured that the man must be 
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Wagner, whom he viewed as a "deadly 
person** intending to kill or torture him. 
Wagner ordered Peters to scoot over. Pe-
ters began to do so, but when Wagner 
grabbed the door handle, Peters shot at 
him. Peters fired two shots, which hit 
Wagner in the chest, before his gun 
jammed. Wagner then fired at Peters, hit-
ting him three times: grazing his check, 
piercing his abdomen, and puncturing his 
hand. Peters escaped out the passenger 
door and ran into his house. His father 
called 911. but Wagner had lied by the 
time the police arrived. Peters willingly 
told the police what occurred. 
}^ 8 At trial, Wagner provided a different 
version of events. Wagner claims he 
sought Peters in order to help him recon-
nect with Lark. Wagner testified that he 
returned to Peters' house to find out 
whether the older man he had spoken 
with before could give him any informa-
tion on how to contact Peters. As he ap-
proached the house, Wagner noticed a 
truck back out of the driveway and drive 
towards him, Wagner claimed he gave a 
little wave to the driver and the truck 
stopped. According to Wagner, the driv-
er then pointed a gun out the window and 
fired two shots at him. Wagner testified 
that when he shot back he was attempt-
ing to shoot the gun out of Peters' hand. 
*[ 9 Although Wagner had been shot 
twice, he was able to walk away from the 
scene. Later Wagner asked a stranger for 
a ride. Wagner told the man that he had 
injured himself falling on the ice. Wagn-
er got a ride to the hilling Station and 
then walked to a storage unit he had 
rented nearby. From there, Wagner 
called a friend who agreed to pick him 
up. Wagner told his friend that he had 
been stabbed in a bar that morning. 
Wagner tended to his wounds at his 
friend's apartment and then called anoth-
er friend to pick him up. Wagner stayed 
with his friend in Ennis for a few days, 
then got a ride to Grcybull, Wyoming, 
where he stayed with another acquain-
tance. Wagner was arrested in Grc)bull a 
few days later on January 25. 2007. 
*| 10 Detectives Cindy Crawford and 
Tom Pallach of the Gallatin County She-
riffs Office travelled to Grcybull to in-
terview Wagner as part of their investi-
gation of the shooting. The detectives 
met with Wagner on January 26, 2007. 
After advising Wagner of his Miranda 
rights, Wagner indicated that he wanted 
to speak to a lawyer, saying that he didn't 
want to dig himself a deeper hole. 
1^ 11 The prosecutor referenced this 
comment four times at Wagner's trial in 
May 2008. In his opening statement, the 
prosecutor said, aOn January 26th, 2007. 
upon being interviewed by the police de-
tectives, and asked whether he'd like to 
make a comment, he simply says. 1 don't 
want to dig myself a deeper hole.** I hen 
during the State's case-in-chicf. the pros-
ecutor asked Detective Crawford on di-
rect examination whether Wagner made 
any statements or admissions after being 
advised of his Miranda rights. Crawford 
replied, "Mr. Wagner stated something 
to the effect where he wanted to speak to 
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an attorney first and he said, don't want 
to dig myself a deeper hole." Later the 
prosecutor ended his cross-examination 
o[ Wagner by questioning him regarding 
the statement: 
*3 Q. Okay. When you were arrested, 
you told the Detectives that you didn't 
want to talk to "em and dig yourself a 
deeper hole, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And today you explained that as noth-
ing I was going to say was going to 
help you. 
A. Yeah, there was no point of saying 
an> thing. 
Q. No point in telling the story back in 
January of 2007? 
A. It wasn't going to help change any-
thing. 
Q. So. 17 months, or 16 months later, 
this is when you tell this story today? 
A. Yes. 
Finally, in his closing argument, the 
prosecutor stated: 
Somebody was right and somebody was 
wrong. So you have to choose who you 
believe. Do you believe Michael Peters 
who, from the very beginning, said, 
yeah, I shot this guy. 1 shot him first, 
and here's why. Or, do you believe the 
Defendant, who doesn't want to dig 
himself a deeper hole. 
Wagner's counsel did not object to these 
repeated prosecutorial comments. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
11 ]12[ €|] 12 This Court may discrclionari-
ly review claimed errors that implicate a 
criminal defendant's fundamental consti-
tutional rights, even if no contemporane-
ous objection was made, "'where failing 
to review the claimed error may result in 
a manifest miscarriage of justice, may 
leave unsettled the question of the fun-
damental fairness of the trial or proceed-
ings, or may compromise the integrity of 
the judicial process/'1 State v Godfrey. 
2004 MT 197. <' 22. 322 Mont. 254. 95 
P.3d 166 (citing State v. Finlev, 276 
Mont. 126, 137. 915 P.2d 208. 215 
(1996), overruled on other grounds by 
Slate v. Gallagher, 2001 Mf 39, 304 
Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817). Wc use our in-
herent power of common law plain error 
review sparingly. Godfrey, *| 22. 
DISCUSSION 
*| 13 Whether the prosecutor's repeated 
comments at trial regarding statements 
Wagner made after invoking his Miranda 
rights created an inference of guilt that 
constituted plain error. 
[3][4] |^ 14 Since Wagner did not object 
to the prosecutor's repeated comments at 
trial, our review requires application of 
the common law plain error doctrine. 
Wagner argues that the prosecutor's 
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comments "leave unsettled the funda-
mental fairness of the trial" by imper-
missibly using Wagner's invocation of 
Miranda rights against him to attack his 
credibility and create an inference of 
guilt, Thus, Wagner claims that the 
State's repeated and deliberate use of his 
invocation of the right to silence war-
rants reversal under plain error review. 
We agree. 
JJLMI 15 The United States Constitution's 
privilege against self-incrimination and 
right to due process prohibit the State 
from using a defendant's invocation of 
Miranda rights against him at trial. U.S. 
Const, amends. V, XIV. The United 
States Supreme Court described the pri-
vilege against self-incrimination as clhe 
hallmark of our democracy," explaining 
that: 
the constitutional foundation underlying 
the privilege is the respect a govern-
ment-state or federal-must accord to 
the dignity and integrity of its citizens. 
To maintain a wCfair state-individual 
balance," to require the government wCto 
shoulder the entire load," to respect the 
inviolability of the human personality, 
our accusatory system of criminal jus-
tice demands that the government seek-
ing to punish an individual produce the 
evidence against him by its own inde-
pendent labors, rather than by the cruel, 
simple expedient of compelling it from 
his own mouth. In sum, the privilege is 
fulfilled only when the person is guar-
anteed the right "to remain silent unless 
he chooses to speak in the unfettered 
exercise of his own will." 
*4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 
460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1620. 16 L.Kd.2d 
694 (1966) (internal citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court required procedural 
safeguards, in the form of Miranda 
warnings, to protect these constitutional 
rights from the inherent coercion of cus-
todial interrogation. 
We have concluded that without proper 
safeguards the process of in-custody in-
terrogation of persons suspected or ac-
cused of crime contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual's will to resist 
and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely. In 
order to combat these pressures and to 
permit a full opportunity to exercise the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the 
accused must be adequately and effec-
tively apprised of his rights and the ex-
ercise of those rights must be fully 
honored. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 86 S.Ct. at 
1624. 
fi| 16 The Supreme Court held in Doyle v. 
Ohio that a prosecutor's impeachment 
use of a defendant's silence after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings was fundamental-
ly unfair because Miranda warnings in-
form a person of his right to remain si-
lent and assure him that his silence will 
not be used against him. 426 U.S. 610n 
618-19, 96 S.Ct. 2240. 2245. 49 L.hd.2d 
91 (1976). The Supreme Court held that 
"the use for impeachment purposes of 
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petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest 
and after receiving Miranda warnings, 
violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. Underlying 
Doyle is the principle that Miranda 
warnings contain an implicit assurance 
that exercising Miranda rights will carry 
no penalty and that vtit would be funda-
mentally unfair and a deprivation of due 
process to allow the arrested person's si-
lence to be used to impeach an explana-
tion subsequently offered at trial.v Doyle, 
426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. 
I611M7 This Court has held that Doyle 
error implicates fundamental constitu-
tional rights that can warrant plain error 
review. Godfrey, f^ 24: State v Sullivan, 
280 Mont. 25. 32-33, 927 P.2d 1033, 
1038 (1996); Finley, 276 Mont, at 138, 
915 P.2d at 216. In the context of Doyle 
error, reversal under plain error review is 
appropriate when the Court is firmly 
convinced that the "prosecutor's com-
ments created an inference for the jury 
that by remaining silent after receiving 
his rights, the defendant must be guilty 
of the alleged crime." Godfrey, |^ 38; see 
also Sullivan. 280 Mont, at 36-37, 927 
P.2dat 1040. 
fi| 18 In State v Sullivan, this Court held 
that the prosecutor committed Doyle er-
ror when he commented on Sullivan's 
posi-Miranda silence during the State's 
opening statement, case-in-chicf. and 
closing argument. 280 Mont, at 35. 927 
P.2dat 1039. 
We conclude that the four separate 
comments made in the State's opening 
statement, during the testimony of De-
tective Shaw, and during the State's 
closing argument regarding Sullivan's 
post-Miranda silence were not harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt. These 
comments and testimony that Sullivan 
declined to give a statement to law en-
forcement officers after being advised 
of his Miranda rights violated Sulli-
van's right to due process. By making 
these comments, the State created an 
inference for the jury that, by remain-
ing silent after having been read his 
rights. Sullivan was guilty of deliberate 
homicide. 
*5 Sullivan, 280 Mont, at 36. 927 P.2d at 
1039-40. The Court reversed based on 
this plain error. The facts here arc similar 
to those in Sullivan. As in Sullivan, the 
prosecutor here used Wagner's post-
Miranda silence in all phases of the trial: 
during his opening statement, his case-
in-chief, his cross-examination of Wagn-
er, and his closing argument. 
[7] |^ 19 Wagner invoked his Miranda 
rights when he requested to speak with 
an attorney. Detective Crawford testified 
that she was present when "Detective Pa-
lash | sic | read him his rights per Miran-
da, and Mr. Wagner stated something to 
the effect where he wanted to speak to an 
attorney first and he said, don't want to 
dig myself a deeper hole." This was an 
effective invocation of Wagner's Miran-
da rights. The United States Supreme 
Court has explained, "fw|ith respect to 
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post- Miranda warnings 'silence/ we 
point out that silence does not mean only 
muteness; it includes the statement of a 
desire to remain silent, as well as of a 
desire to remain silent until an attorney 
has been consulted." Wainwright v. 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 n. 13. 106 
S.Ct. 634. 640 n. 13, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 
(1986). In Doyle, the Supreme Court un-
derstood "silence" to include the defen-
dant's response of w'[w|hat's this all 
about?" Dovle, 426 U.S. at 614 n. 5, 96 
S.Cl. at 2243 n. 5. Thus, Wagner's re-
quest to speak with an attorney and his 
comment that he didn't want to dig him-
self a deeper hole is a sufficient invoca-
tion of his right to remain silent. 
*| 20 The prosecutor used Wagner's post-
Miranda silence to create an inference of 
guilt. The prosecutor relied on Wagner's 
failure to tell his version of events until 
trial as evidence of his guilt. On cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked 
Wagner about his initial interview with 
the police: 
Q. No point in telling the story back in 
January of 2007? 
A. ft wasn't going to help change any-
thing. 
Q. So, 17 months, or 16 months later, 
this is when you tell this story today? 
A. Yes. 
Clearly the prosecutor was overreaching. 
His questions were designed to create an 
inference that, by declining to give his 
version of events after invoking his Mi-
randa rights. Wagner must be guilty. 
Further, the prosecutor implied that 
Wagner's posi-Miranda statement that he 
didn't want to dig a deeper hole was an 
admission of guilt. The prosecutor ended 
his cross-examination of Wagner by 
enumerating the multiple lies that Wagn-
er told people in his search for Peters and 
after the shooting. The prosecutor eli-
cited at least 21 acknowledged lies told 
by Wagner. This line of questioning was 
sufficient to undermine Wagner's credi-
bility in front of the jury. However, the 
prosecutor went too far by impermissibly 
implying that Wagner's failure to tell his 
story earlier or his comment about dig-
ging a deeper hole was evidence of his 
guilt. 
1] 21 This inference of guilt caused actual 
prejudice to Wagner constituting plain 
error. 
A fundamental aspect of "plain error," is 
that the alleged error indeed must be 
"plain." In a case such as this, it should 
leave one firmly convinced, as we were 
in Sullivan, that the prosecutor's com-
ments created an inference for the jury 
that by remaining silent after receiving 
his rights, the defendant must be guilty 
of the alleged crime. 
*6 Godfrey, f|] 38. Thus, we hold that the 
prosecutor's conduct raises questions re-
garding the fundamental fairness of the 
trial by violating Wagner's constitutional 
right to due process and privilege against 
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self-incrimination. 
TI 22 Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial consistent with this opinion. 
We concur: JAMLS C. NELSON, PA-
TRICIA O. COTTER, W. WILLIAM 
LEA PI I ARE JOHN WARNER, and 
BRIAN MORRIS. 
Justice JIM RICK, dissenting. 
aj] 23 We exercise plain error review 
''when failure to do so may result in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice, leave un-
settled the fundamental fairness of the 
proceedings, or compromise the integrity 
of the judicial process.v State v. Lacey, 
2009 MT 62, *? 74, 349 Mont 37 L 204 
P.3d 1192 (citation omitted). I do not be-
lieve these reasons exist here. 
*![ 24 I would affirm on the basis of the 
case explanation given by the Court in ^ 
3-9. The Court cannot even explain the 
facts of this case without exposing 
Wagner's ludicrous talc of lies, such as 
his telling a friend after the shooting in-
cident that "'he had been stabbed in a bar 
that morning/* Opinion, ^ 9. The jury did 
not believe, and no jury would, Wagner's 
claim that, while on the run from the law, 
he loaded a gun and went to Peters' 
house simply "to find out whether the 
older man he had spoken with before 
could give him any information on how 
to contact Peters," particularly given 
Wagner's history of sadistic and vengeful 
violence toward his victims. Opinion, *( 
8. 
ject while the prosecutor made multiple 
references to the comment he now chal-
lenges. Elad he brought the issue to the 
District Court's attention by making a 
single objection, the court could have 
sustained the objection and instructed the 
jury about the comment. Wagner now 
gets the benefit of his own inaction, per-
haps a strategy he purposefully cm-
ployed. Regardless, a new trial should 
not be his reward in light of the over-
whelming evidence against him. No 
"miscarriage of justice" occurred here 
for which plain error review is necessary. 
While victims must sometimes be incon-
venienced by a re-trial so that the integri-
ty of the judicial process can be pre-
served, the only "miscarriage of justice" 
in this case is putting the victims through 
the trauma of a second showing of 
Wagner's utterly unbelievable assertions. 
*|[ 26 I would not grant plain error review, 
and would affirm. 
Mont..2009. 
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25 Wagner sat by idly and failed to ob-
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